It is part of the badge of being a red-blooded American businessman to oppose government regulation of business and-as the ultimate anathema-to oppose government takeover, i.e., government operation of an enterprise that might otherwise be run by private business.
coverage for new categories and provision for higher payments. Many an insurance executive anxiously looks over his shoulder to see to what extent government insurance is catching up with him. In fact, however, the growth of social security and other forms of social insurance has been very modest in the United States compared to other industrialized countries. Nevertheless, the insurance executive still feels the threat of government takeover looming large.
To examine the depths of this fear-and how realistic it is-we might t Professor of Law, The University of Illinois.
turn to the current controversy over reform of automobile insurance. It is true that there have recently been several proposals for turning over at least a part of automobile insurance to federal insurance, i.e., insurance written and administered by the federal government. 1 In at least one instance, the seriousness of these proposals has been exaggerated. It is often pointed out that Daniel P. Moynihan, former Director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies at Harvard-M.I.T. and currently Executive Secretary of President Nixon's Council for Urban Affairs, has advocated a system of federal insurance for traffic accidents. 2 In fact, a close reading of Moynihan's article reveals that his proposal for federal insurance was actually a less favored alternative to a system of private automobile insurance, payable, unlike the present tort system, without regard to who is at fault in the accident. Speaking of such nonfault insurance to be administered by private insurance companies whereby an insurance company will pay its own insured regardless of fault, Moynihan stated:
This is exactly what happens, for example, with fire insurance. Householders buy their own insurance. If their house catches fire, regardless of who is responsible (barring fraud), their company compensates them. The settlement process involves a relationship between a business firm and one of its clients. Americans are good at. We are good at maintaining business relationships once a basis for mutual self-interest is established. The Basic Protection Plan would establish one. 4 The trouble is that many insurance executives view such a proposal of nonfault insurance whereby a company pays its own insured regardless of who is to blame for the accident as inevitably leading to federal insurance. Proposals for nonfault auto insurance have been made since the early 1980's 5 and until very recently the almost unanimous response of the insurance industry was to dismiss such plans, often labeling them as "socialistic." 6 At first blush it is a little hard to understand why such plans should be labeled as socialistic. The term "socialism," after all, connotes governmental ownership of the means of production and control of the distribution of goods. 7 But almost all the plans proposed for nonfault automobile insurance have explicitly preserved private insurance as the means of administering the system. 8 Even if the definition of "socialism" be stretched to include increased governmental regulation of business, the reform proposals usually do not change the basic pattern of insurance regulation from that operating today.
In one sense, however, it may be understandable that nonfault in-Insurance Company will compensate him;
(2) the second feature of the plan is a law that partially exempts from liability for negligent driving all those insured under Basic Protection (which will include virtually all motorists, since Basic Protection Insurance will be a prerequisite to registration of an automobile). In those tort cases in which damages for pain and suffering do not exceed $5,000, and other damages, such as those for medical expenses and wage loss, do not exceed $10,000, liability for negligence would be eliminated. In all other cases, the exemption would reduce the liability for negligence by the same amount. 4 Moynihan, supra note 1, at 82. surance should be labeled "socialistic." The development of liability based on fault coincided with the industrial revolution. Nor was this joint development by chance, according to Fowler Harper and Fleming James. "It was but another manifestation of the individualism which underlies laissez faire as a political philosophy." Industrial activity was not to be burdened with the inevitable toll it exacts in human life and limb unless the activity had not been carried out with due care. Also, there was to be no imposition of liability unless the defendant had been "guilty of some personal moral shortcoming,"' 0 and there was to be no leveling by lumping the careful and careless together. Given the earlier identity of the fault concept with the heyday of laissez faire capitalism, perhaps it is not surprising that the converse identification of the opposite of payment based on fault-namely payment based on other than fault-should be identified with the opposite of laissez faire capitalism-namely socialism. But, in fact, the equation of payment without reference to fault with socialism is specious. Insurance payable without reference to who is at fault is perfectly consistent with private enterprise as generations of private insurance coverage of workmen's compensation have demonstrated. But if the historical argument falls, insurers have another reason they advance for identifying payment of insurance without reference to fault with government insurance. According to James Kemper, Jr., President of the Kemper Insurance Companies, the surest road to federal regulation and federal automobile insurance is the Basic Protection plan.
[.. [T] he Basic Protection plan, a compulsory accident insurance system which . . . largely eliminates the need for determining fault, is primarily a system for dispensing benefits, and therefore a natural precursor to a complete takeover of this segment of the private sector by the federal government.
[I]t is a matter of cause and effect: Basic Protection leading irresistably to federal insurance." But why should making insurance compulsory and payable without reference to fault lead "irresistably" to federal insurance? It certainly has not done so in the case of workmen's compensation. Certainly the wide variety of other forms of nonfault insurance-such as accident and health coverage and fire insurance-have not led "irresistably" to their being taken over by the federal government. In other words, the mere fact that a system of insurance is "primarily a system for dispensing benefits" does not make such a system "a natural precursor to a complete takeover of [that] ... segment of the private sector by the federal government."' 12 Nevertheless, some insurance executives continue to equate simplifying auto insurance with a federal takeover. One version of the argument-as I have pieced it together in conversation with different insurance personnel-seems to run something like this: The simplei and easier the manner of payment, the more readily the government can step in and take it over, absorbing the coverage in its ever-expanding social security program. On the other hand, the more the criterion for payment is complicated, the more argument there is likely to be over what, if anything, is to be paid, which in turn undermines the government's confidence in its ability to administer the program. In other words, the government has little taste for insurance which is going to lead to constant battles over who and what is to be paid. Thus, the more the flavor of the complicated tort system can be preserved, the less likely government takeover of that form of insurance.
Does this explain, at least in part, the formula of the Guaranteed Benefits Plan, principally sponsored by the American Mutual Insurance Alliance, wherein the victim of an auto accident is given a rather complicated option, in dealing with the other driver's insurance company, of taking nonfault benefits for his out-of-pocket loss and waiving his tort claim or, on the other hand, pursuing his tort claim? 18
When I gently chided one insurance executive that the Guaranteed Benefits Plan seemed purposely to build in friction and a complicated mode of payment in order to stave off government insurance, he replied, no doubt sincerely, that the Guaranteed Benefits Plan retains the fault criterion, not so much as a complication for complication's sake, but because of the belief that the public wants to retain the fault criterion--or at least have the option of doing so after an accident. Such a reason, assuming it is valid, would make sense. However, several recent surveys would seem to indicate that the public would prefer being guaranteed payment by one's own insurance company for outof-pocket loss regardless of fault as opposed to taking the chance of recovering more if, and only if, a tort claim can be established. A survey conducted at the University of Illinois showed 71 per cent of those responding preferring such nonfault payment. 1 4 A survey conducted by the American Insurance Association showed about 72 per cent of those expressing an opinion favoring nonfault insurance. 5 And a poll conducted by the Minneapolis Tribune reversed a finding of an earlier poll by the same paper which indicated that the public prefers the fault system. Although the earlier poll showed some 64 per cent of those expressing an opinion opposed to nonfault insurance, 16 the later poll, which asked the respondents to assume there would be prompter payment and lower insurance premiums under nonfault insurance by almost 25 per cent, found 67 per cent of those expressing an opinion favoring such nonfault insurance.' 7 But the important point is that whereas public preference is a legitimate factor in deciding how automobile insurance ought to be restructured, if at all, speculation on which mode of insurance is more or less likely to lead to government takeover seems both far-fetched and not a very sound basis for structuring automobile insurance reform. 
1969]
In the first place, there has been simplified nonfault criterion for payment of claims in many forms of insurance for generations without governmental takeover. Secondly, the reason for government takeover of any line of insurance seems to be not so much the ease of payment, but whether private insurance is performing adequately in selling and servicing the market. For example, Medicare (medical insurance for the aged under social security) came into being because private insurance companies were not providing adequate medical insurance for the aged. Similarly, federal crop insurance and flood insurance came about because of the inadequacy of privately offered insurance. As an additional example, federal reinsurance to cover property in the inner city was an outgrowth of the inadequacy of the private market and indeed occurred at the invitation of the insurance industry. Concerning both federal regulation and federal ownership of automobile insurance, Robert Rennie, Vice-President of Nationwide Insurance Company, stated in response to James Kemper's fears:
I must also take issue with Mr. Kemper's comments on the threat of federal regulation and federal preemption. In my view, the threat lies not in reform of state systems, but in the absence of state action. It is when the states fail to follow clearly identified lines for dealing with a social problem that the federal government moves in.' 8 As I read Mr. Rennie, he is convinced that federal automobile insurance will not follow from simplifying the insured event but rather from too strong a commitment to the status quo and all its inadequacies.
That not all the insurance industry equates simplifying the insured event with an "irresistable" takeover by the federal government is shown by the recent so-called Complete Protection Plan proposed by the American Insurance Association, a trade organization of 168 stock insurance companies who write approximately 38 per cent of all automobile insurance in the United States. Under this plan, in every instance and without any option, one's own insurance company would pay a victim for his out-of-pocket expenses, regardless of fault, and the tort suit arising from auto accidents would be completely eliminated. 9 Regardless of the ultimate merits of this proposal (about which, as with the Basic Protection Plan, there is legitimate difference of opin-
